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(paperback); and Credit and Blame, Princeton University Press, 2008, ISBN 9780691135786,
£14.95 (paperback)
There are two reasons that make this a difficult review to write. The first is that the author
of both books, Charles Tilly, is no longer alive (he died on April 29, 2008). The second is
that both books are not themselves squarely addressed to criminal lawyers or theorists; nor
do they respond, at least not explicitly, to the problems and challenges lurking amongst the
tangles of thickets of criminal law and its theoretical literature.
Reviewing books of recently deceased authors is difficult not only because those authors
no longer have an opportunity to reply or cannot, more wishfully, make any use of one’s
comments. They are difficult because one feels that what is appropriate is the celebration of
a lifetime’s work. This is all the more so when the author is as much esteemed, and indeed
as much loved, as Tilly.
Turning to the second difficulty, reviewing books that do not fall within a certain
disciplinary boundary of interest to the editors and readers of a particular journal, raises the
potential for conflict, disappointment and misunderstanding between the authors of
reviews, book-review editors, and readers.
It is relevant to begin with these difficulties because both of these books deal with
exactly the sorts of worries expressed above, namely with providing reasons, sometimes in
order to assign credit or blame, where what is at stake is the establishment, confirmation,
negotiation or reparation of the relations between the givers of reasons and their receivers.
The earlier and broader of the two books, Why? (2006; hereinafter, within citations, W),
looks at four different kinds of reason giving: conventions, stories, codes and technical
accounts. The later and shorter book, Credit and Blame (2008; hereinafter, within citations,
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C & B), focuses in on the second of the above four categories, i.e., stories, insofar as they
dominate the ways in which credit and blame tend to be assigned.
Both books are to be applauded for their simplicity and accessibility, while remaining
remarkably analytically acute, subtle and erudite. They are also to be admired because
before the publication of these two books (in the last few years of his life), Tilly was
known largely for his historically-informed sociological work on large-scale social pro-
cesses, principally revolutions and democratisation, as well as for his contribution to social
science research methodology. All scholars know how difficult it is to turn to new material
in the twilight of one’s career, especially with as much zest and light-footedness as Tilly
has achieved here. With these two books, then, current and future generations will also
remember, and fittingly celebrate, Tilly for a unique contribution to our understanding of
the pervasive practices of giving and receiving reasons, and assigning credit and blame.
There are plenty of insights in these two books of obvious relevance for criminal
lawyers and theorists. Indeed, Tilly’s discussion of codes as a form of reason giving
(chapter four of Why?) itself indicates that he is by no means oblivious to some of the
unique aspects, as well as benefits and costs, of code-governed reasons. The credibility of
reasons based on codes does not emanate from the cause-effect validity that prevails in
stories and technical accounts, but from ‘logics of appropriateness’, i.e., the categories,
procedures and rules that have emerged over time, incrementally, in organisations. Codes
have their own dynamics, which emerge from the give and take of organisational life,
thereby also containing ‘residues of organisational histories’ and limiting current behaviour
within organisations (W, p. 104).
The gap that Tilly identifies between codes and stories is important. Whatever cause-
effect reasoning might go on in the life of legal organisations, what dominates, particularly
in courtrooms, is the matching of evidence concerning behaviour to the available cate-
gories. Stories, on the other hand, are radically simplified ‘explanatory narratives that are
composed of one or a few actors, a limited number of actions that cause further actions
through altered states of awareness, continuity in space and time, and an overall structure
leading to some outcome or lesson’ (W, p. 85). They minimise or avoid the causal role of
errors, unanticipated consequences, as well as indirect, incremental, simultaneous, envi-
ronmental and other effects, which feature in technical reason giving (and which are
explored in detail in chapter five). Further, stories tend to ‘rely on (or claim) membership in
a shared community of belief’, whereas ‘codes typically call up careful matching of the
individuals involved with standardised identities’ (or roles, such as prosecutor, judge, juror,
defendant, etc.) (W, p. 27). For example, where that shared community of belief is a
Christian one, the narrative idiom is likely to resemble the ‘Christian hero’, where the
narrative pattern is composed of someone else’s action or remark making the Christian
hero aware of his failings, followed by divine inspiration being sought by the stricken hero,
and finally a change in course by the hero (W, p. 63). Typically wide-ranging (and also
characteristically entertaining), Tilly discusses in this context Raphael Samuel’s biography
of East End Underworld character, Arthur Harding, whose accounts (based on interviews
spanning many years) revealed just how much he conformed to that kind of narrative idiom
and pattern (see W, pp. 85–89; Samuel 1981).
In setting up a gap between stories and codes, Tilly also portrays professionals involved
in legal organisations—including judges, lawyers and police officers—as constantly per-
forming conversions from popular idioms into specialised discourses (W, p. 120). The
specialised discourse that stories need to be translated into resembles more closely the
formula-based nature of conventions, rather than the (simplified) cause-effect scenarios of
stories. Like codes, conventions (e.g., ‘my train was late’, ‘your turn finally came’, etc.)
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rest on ‘logics of appropriateness’, i.e., when they work, ‘they do so because they fit
appropriately into local conditions, not because they offer adequate explanations of what
actually happens locally’ (W, p. 60). Also like codes, they tend to ‘smooth interpersonal
relations’, though conventions do so without relying on expert knowledge. Finally, one
could add here that reasons based on codes and conventions also resemble each other in
their (at least defeasible) finality.
If there is such a gap between code-based reasons and story-based reasons, and if legal
professionals are constantly involved in feats of translation, then it would presumably
benefit legal professionals to pay more attention to the way stories work. This is the theme
taken up by Credit and Blame (2008). Retaining certain features of the account of story-
based reasons from Why?, the later book goes much deeper into the kinds of judgements
persons make when using stories to assign credit and blame. Indeed, story-based reasons
and assigning credit and blame go hand in hand. Stories, as already noted above, are
explanatory narratives incorporating limited numbers of actors, action and simplified
cause-effect accounts in which the actors’ actions produce all the significant outcomes
(C & B, p. 20). Judgements of credit and blame rely on identifying an effective agent, i.e.,
someone who caused some outcome, which, in turn, produces a certain change in value
(C & B, p. 12). Both stories and the assigning of credit and blame would not be possible
without the foundational concepts of outcome, agency, competence and responsibility
(C & B, p. 11).
Somewhat cutely, and with, one presumes, some irony, Tilly offers us what he calls a
‘justice detector’, i.e., a method for understanding, and indeed performing, the assignment
of credit or blame: ‘identify the relevant activity, single out the crucial actor, pinpoint the
action(s) in question, specify the effect, figure the actor’s contribution to that effect,
estimate the value change, rate the actor’s competence and responsibility, multiply the
elements, and voila`: your own assignment of credit or blame’ (C & B, p. 37). For the bulk
of the book, Tilly shows the justice detector at work in an impressive variety of social
contexts, including networks, promotions, honours and tournaments with respect to credit,
and courtrooms and commissions (including Truth and Reconciliation Commissions and
the 9/11 Commission) with respect to blame.
Although he offers many examples from the practices of assigning credit and blame in
everyday life, Tilly is also very sensitive to the ‘rough ground’ of public memorials of
victory, loss and blame (C & B, p. 125). One of the book’s most important messages is how
both everyday life and public assignment of credit and blame (but particularly blame in
public contexts) tends to sharpen any pre-existing, or if not, then create, us-them bound-
aries. He warns of the democracy-undermining dangers of writing us-them divisions into
law and politics. Public monuments, based on inevitably selective collective memory,
where, typically, what is blamed by ‘us’ is credited by ‘them’, may facilitate division (and
retaliation) rather than reconciliation and reparation.
Clearly, however, Tilly is not attacking the ‘successful pursuit of legal redress’—a form
of the public assignment of blame—that he explicitly says ‘reinforces democracy’ (C & B,
p. 150). Indeed, for Tilly, not only is the legal system ‘an echo chamber for conversations
about credit and blame’ (C & B, p. 35), but blame, which ‘can easily become a persistent,
destructive habit’, can also bring struggles to end, i.e., it can be creatively destructive (C &
B, p. 119). It can achieve this when it is ‘carried out successfully through retaliation,
incapacitation, deterrence, rehabilitation, and/or restoration’ (C & B, p. 119)—all of which
receive analysis in the book’s second chapter, which looks specifically at how judgements
of blame are matched up with punishments. Experts on punishment will find little to be
surprised about here, but the book manages to be so simple and accessible that it is likely to
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be as refreshing for experts, as it is highly (and importantly) informative for non-
specialists. Indeed, just as the book may allow criminal lawyers and theorists to appreciate
a little bit more about the structure of stories that dominate popular conceptions of justice,
so it may enable non-specialists to appreciate the peculiar dynamics of legal organisations.
All these are insights readily available to criminal lawyers and theorists who wish to
rush to see the relevance of these two books for their work. But the books speak on many
other levels too. Tilly has much to say, in both books, but particularly in Credit and Blame,
on the life of the academic world. Theorists concerned about the ethical life of academic
communities will find much to learn from here about sometimes not easily spotted (or at
least taken for granted) structures of credit and blame that have their own effects on how
scholars do scholarship (e.g., his behind-the-scenes discussion of academic prizes is both
amusing and depressing; see C & B, pp. 67–71).
However, more simply, and equally more fundamentally, both books remind us just how
often, in both specialised domains and everyday life, we express judgement on each other.
Further, both books remind us how those judgements—which Tilly recognises are
expressed both verbally and non-verbally—are means by which we constantly negotiate
and re-negotiate our relationships. The books help us to see relations being negotiated
where we might otherwise have missed them, just like here, in this review, relations, inter
alia, between the author and reviewer, editor and reviewer, readers and reviewer, and
readers and editor, are at stake. And is this more general lesson not easy to lose sight of
when we, as legal scholars, spend the bulk of our time thinking about categories, proce-
dures and rules?
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